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CASE COMMENTS
PLEADING AND PRACICE
Discovery: Good Cause and Governmental Privilege
Normally, a case comment does not reiterate the detailed
facts of the controversy, but in the tax trial of Campbell v.
Eastland,, the astuteness and competency of the taxpayer's
attorney in his unique approach to safeguarding his client's
rights are material to understanding the issues involved.
The taxpayer, Eastland, was investigated by Internal
Revenue agents for possible tax fraud charges. Upon com-
pletion of their investigation, the government agents recom-
mended criminal proceedings for tax evasion be instituted.
Before such charges were placed, the attorney for the taxpayer
contacted the United States Attorney and impressed upon him
that a review of the investigative reports would prove the tax-
payer innocent. The United States Attorney acceded to the
request and agreed to defer any action until he could go into
the file more thoroughly. Immediately thereafter, the taxt
payer instituted a civil action for a tax refund in the Distric-
Court. It is at this point where the cross-roads of contention
were reached, namely, the taxpayer's petition for discovery2
to obtain documents that were held by the government for
use in criminal proceedings, and the government's refusal
based on its defense of privilege. The usually liberal attitude
of the Federal Courts of entertaining motions for discovery
in civil actions will not supersede the requirement for good
cause 3 and the application of governmental privilege in the
particular instance.
Considerable latitude4 is permitted the trial judge in
granting motions for discovery, and, "Considerations of
practical convenience are of importance."s A showing of
1307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962).
2FED. R. CIV. P. 34; June v. George C. Peterson Co., 155 F.2d 963 (7th
Cir. 1946); Maddux v. Wright, 11 F.R.D. 170, (D.D.C. 1951); Bingle
v. Liggett Drug Co., 11 F.R.D. 593, (DMass. 1951); Siegel v. Yates,
11 F.R.D. 129, (S.D. N.Y. 1951); United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 7
F.R.D. 442, (W.D.N.Y. 1945).
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 34; Martin v. Capitol Transit Co., 170 F.2d 811 (D.C.
1948); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 203 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953).
4 Leach v. Greif Bros. Cooperage Corp., 2 mmRD. 444, (S.D. Miss. 1942).
5 Gordon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 5 F.R.D. 510, (E.D. Penn. 1946).
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good cause is the chief requisite for approving such a motion,
but as to defining what constitutes good cause is another
problem and quite nebulous. Ordinarily, the court will not
have difficulty in making a decision when it is apparent that
the moving party has other means of obtaining the information
sought, 8 or when it is indicative that mere exploration of the
opposition's files7 is the main purpose of the motion.
In this case, the enigma of good cause was further com-
pounded by the appellant's interjection of governmental
privilege. 8 Generally, the government is privileged from
disclosing information that pertains to military or state secrets; 9
but in ordinary civil actions the government, ". . . is subject
to sanctions the same as a private litigant,"'" and, "it must
either give up its privilege to withhold pertinent evidence
or it must abandon its suit for relief." 1" The usual exception
to the doctrine of privilege is found in tort actions against the
government since sovereign immunity has been waived by
allowing the claimant to sue. 2
Undoubtedly, a salient issue in the case concerned the
validity of the motion for discovery in the civil action prior
to the initiation of potential criminal proceedings. The
lower court observed the strict view that such actions were
separate and distinct, and that the provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would prevail. Obviously, this would
permit the appellee to have access to reports that ordinarily
would be denied to him under the restrictive controls of
criminal procedure. 13 Upon appeal, the reason for reversal
G Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 509 (1947); Dellameo v. Great Lakes S.S. Co.,
9 F.R.D. 77, (N.D. Ohio 1949); G. & P. Amusement Co. v. Regent
Theater Co., 9 F.R.D. 721, (N.D. Ohio 1949).
7 Szubinski v. Commercial Sash & Door Co., 15 F.R.D. 274, (N.D. IIl. 1953).
8 FED. R. CIV. P. 34; 5 U.S.C.A. 22.
9 Torten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co.,
26 F.Supp. 583 (D.C. E.D. N.Y. 1939).
10 Bank Line Ltd. v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 801 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
11 Fleming v. Bernardi, 1 F.R.D. 624 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
12 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Bentley v. United States, 16
F.R.D. 247, (Md. Ga. 1954).
l3Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); 18 U.S.C. 3500; Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
1963] CASE COMMENTS 247
was not clarified under any rule of law, but primarily on the
basis that administrative policy gives priority to the public
interest in law enforcement.
Because of the beneficial results of such a policy, a measure
of credit must be given to the Court's decision of reversing and
remanding the case, even though an important aspect of
procedural rights fell victim to judicial legislation. If a novel
avenue is discovered by a litigant in a civil action through a
tactical maneuver to obtain information held by the govern-
ment which he intends to use as a basis for a criminal defense,
the legislature is the channel for rectification. Since it is the
trial judge who is given the discretionary powers and authority
to grant motions for discovery, his decisions should not be
negated by restrictive controls based on abstract reasonings
of policy.
S. C. S.
